A Cost-Based Model of Seasonal Production, with Application to Milk Policy by Hennessy, David A. & Roosen, Jutta
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
1-2003
A Cost-Based Model of Seasonal Production, with
Application to Milk Policy
David A. Hennessy
Iowa State University, hennessy@iastate.edu
Jutta Roosen
University Catholique de Louvain
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Economic Policy Commons, and the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hennessy, David A. and Roosen, Jutta, "A Cost-Based Model of Seasonal Production, with Application to Milk Policy" (2003). CARD
Working Papers. 339.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/339
A Cost-Based Model of Seasonal Production, with Application to Milk
Policy
Abstract
Milk production is seasonal in many European countries. While quantity seasonality poses capacity
management problems for dairy processors, a European Union policy goal is to reduce price seasonality. After
developing a model of endogenous seasonality, we study the effects of three E.U. policies on production
decisions. These are private storage subsidies, production removals, and production quotas. When cost
functions are seasonal in a specified way, then arbitrage opportunities interact with storage subsidies to reduce
both price and consumption seasonality. But production seasonality likely increases because storage subsidies
promote temporal market integration. Conditions are identified under which product market interventions
increase quantity seasonality.
Keywords
efficiency, market intervention, quota, stabilization, storage subsidies
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Agricultural Economics | Economic Policy | Economics
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/339
  
 
A Cost-Based Model of Seasonal Production,  
with Application to Milk Policy 
 
 
David A. Hennessy and Jutta Roosen 
 
 
Working Paper 03-WP 323 
January 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 
www.card.iastate.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David A. Hennessy is a professor in the Department of Economics and the Center for Agricultural 
and Rural Development, Iowa State University. Jutta Roosen is an assistant professor, Faculté de 
Sciences Agronomique, University Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
 
This journal paper of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa, 
Project No. 3463, was supported by Hatch Act and State of Iowa funds.  
 
This publication is available online on the CARD website: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is 
granted to reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the authors and the Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070. 
 
For questions or comments about the contents of this paper, please contact David Hennessy, 
578C Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070; Ph: 515-294-6171; Fax: 515-294-
6336; E-mail: hennessy@iastate.edu. 
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, religion, national origin, sexual 
orientation, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. Vietnam Era Veteran. Any persons having 
inquiries concerning this may contact the Director of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, 1350 Beardshear Hall, 
515-294-7612. 
  
Abstract 
Milk production is seasonal in many European countries. While quantity seasonality 
poses capacity management problems for dairy processors, a European Union policy goal 
is to reduce price seasonality. After developing a model of endogenous seasonality, we 
study the effects of three E.U. policies on production decisions. These are private storage 
subsidies, production removals, and production quotas. When cost functions are seasonal 
in a specified way, then arbitrage opportunities interact with storage subsidies to reduce 
both price and consumption seasonality. But production seasonality likely increases 
because storage subsidies promote temporal market integration. Conditions are identified 
under which product market interventions increase quantity seasonality. 
 
Keywords: efficiency, market intervention, quota, stabilization, storage subsidies. 
 
  
 
 
 
A COST-BASED MODEL OF SEASONAL PRODUCTION,  
WITH APPLICATION TO MILK POLICY 
1. Introduction 
Milk production is characterized by a high degree of seasonality in some countries of 
the European Union. This is a striking feature of production patterns in Ireland where milk 
producers rely mostly on summer-grazing, spring-calving systems, and 85 percent of 
manufacturing milk is produced from March through October (Crosse, O’Brien, and Ryan, 
2000). This strong seasonality has important implications for the efficiency of bovine 
agriculture. While the production of milk is highly seasonal, demand for dairy products is 
quite stable throughout the year. Highly seasonal patterns generate a need to build suffi-
cient (peak-load) capacities for transporting and, as milk is a perishable product, processing 
peak production. This leads to idle capacity during months of low supply. 
Milk from spring-calving herds pose an additional problem in the processability of 
milk. Late-lactation milk is in general of lower quality, as measured in somatic cell 
counts, total bacterial counts, and free fatty acids. Crosse, O’Brien, and Ryan (2000) 
suggest that a consequence of seasonality is that dairy processing will occur only over 
limited intervals during the year. With non-convexities in processing cost structures, 
processors facing seasonal milk inflows may find it unprofitable to engage extensively in 
high-value-added processing of the better-quality milk they do receive. Nor are the 
implications of dairying seasonality confined to that sector. Seasonal patterns in calving 
contribute to seasonal patterns in beef production, and here again the costs may be large. 
Apart from direct capacity management issues, increased line speed in animal slaughter-
ing facilities may contribute to an increase in carcass pathogen contaminations (Bell, 
1997; Sheridan, 1998).1 
While it technically may be feasible to adjust the natural milk supply patterns, any at-
tempt to do so through policy interventions must satisfy biotechnological constraints. Caine 
and Stonehouse (1983) have proposed two different policy measures to adjust seasonal 
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milk supply in Ontario, Canada. One is a quarterly quota system and the other is a seasonal 
subsidy payment to encourage milk production during winter. The use of pricing schemes 
to adjust the seasonality of milk production is, however, not as simple as it may seem at 
first glance. While the low volume of winter milk suggests that it may come at a premium, 
the poor quality of late-lactation (thus, mainly winter) milk has encouraged the use of 
payment schemes that reward summer production.2 Any pricing scheme designed to 
promote quality and also alter seasonal production must recognize that the underlying 
biotechnology imposes interactions between season and quality. 
When deciding on a specific calving system, and hence on its milk production pat-
tern, farmers have to account for various economic parameters. These include the 
abundance of low-cost feed during summer months, the seasonality of milk prices, and 
how quality affects prices. But the policy environment is also important, and in this paper 
we are concerned with policies that affect seasonality. In particular, we look at two 
aspects of E.U. milk policies. While commercial milk prices are set in private markets, 
the European Union has available a number of policy instruments that can alter the level 
and seasonal pattern of prices. One instrument is the subsidization of private storage 
activities in milk product markets. A second is intervention to permanently remove 
product from the marketplace. We also are concerned with how a third policy, the main-
tenance of milk marketing quotas, might modify the effects of storage subsidy and 
removal policies on seasonality. 
With the intent to stabilize markets, the E.U. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
seeks to reduce price seasonality through subsidies that encourage the private purchase 
and storage of product at times of high production for sale at times of low production. In 
a two-season model, we provide precise conditions that support the intuition that seasonal 
cost advantages lead to seasonal production patterns in markets where product is storable. 
And we establish that, whether or not a quota regime is in place, a storage subsidy 
dampens price seasonality by amplifying production seasonality. We also will show that 
the overall incentive to produce may rise or fall with a storage subsidy. 
In studying interventions to support market prices by permanently removing product 
from the market when the price is low, we also consider environments in which quotas are 
and are not in effect. Our two-season model is extended to establish the rather nonintuitive 
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result that, absent a quota regime, such product removal interventions could dampen 
production seasonality under plausible assumptions about the production technology. When 
a quota regime is in place, the interventions have no effect on production seasonality. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief review of seasonality in milk produc-
tion and of relevant E.U. policy, we present formal treatments of a policy to subsidize 
private storage and a policy of permanent product removal in the trough price season. In 
each case, these treatments are first presented absent a quota regime, and then with the 
imposition of a quota regime. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of policy issues. 
 
2. Background 
Commercial dairy production in northwestern Europe has long been characterized by 
seasonality. This is due mainly to managerial decisions to spring calve in order to take 
advantage of cheap summer forage. While still a prominent feature of milk production in 
many locations, quantity seasonality has become less pronounced in recent years as new 
forage conservation methods have become available. The use of artificial insemination 
and improved housing conditions for dairy cows also may have contributed to reduced 
seasonality.3 
Figure 1 compares two snapshots (the years 1975 and 2000) of the milk production 
pattern in Ireland, where approximately 5 percent of E.U. milk is produced. It can be seen 
that, when normalized to control for the overall increase in dairy production, the strongly 
seasonal pattern has declined somewhat. The standard deviation of monthly production 
shares decreased from 0.052 in 1975 to 0.044 in 2000. However, in many other European 
countries the seasonality pattern developed quite differently. For instance, the standard 
deviation of monthly production shares decreased from 0.011 to 0.006 in the United 
Kingdom and from 0.015 to 0.009 in France between 1973 and 1997. Figure 2 confirms 
that Irish milk production, in contrast to other countries, has remained highly seasonal, with 
a 7 to 1 ratio of peak monthly production (May) to trough monthly production (January).4 
The persistence of strongly seasonal production in Ireland may have a variety of con-
tributing factors. First, compared with other countries in northern Europe, Ireland has a low 
population density and so has low local demand for liquid milk. In the path of the Gulf 
Stream and the accompanying rain clouds, Ireland is endowed with a climate that is  
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FIGURE 1. Changes in the seasonality of milk production in Ireland in million tons of 
milk intake by creameries and pasteurizers per month 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Seasonality of milk production relative to annual production in France, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom, 1999 
 
favorable to grass growth between April and October. At lower elevations in East Munster 
and South Leinster, this climate meets soils that are well suited for grass growth. As a 
result, dairying is a popular enterprise, and almost all milk production is destined for 
processing. In addition, it is relatively easy to store, at a cost, many processed dairy prod-
ucts. With milk for processing, farmers are relatively free to make the best use of cheap in 
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situ summer grazing. And so, the overwhelming majority of Irish milk herds are spring-
calving herds. Irish farmers do not incur much of a price penalty for producing in the 
summer. As can be seen from Figure 3, while farm-level prices are counterseasonal relative 
to quantity seasonality, the amplitude of price seasonality has been less than one-fifth that 
of quantity seasonality in recent years. Over the latter part of the 1990s, Irish price season-
ality broadly has been comparable with patterns in France and the United Kingdom. 
Also, the persistence of seasonality in Irish milk production patterns may be explained 
by the conjoin of a fact and a conjecture, both of which were alluded to earlier. The fact is 
that milk quality declines as the parturition date recedes. The conjecture is that endogenous 
quantity seasonality in production may be, in part, determined by the presence of process-
ing technology nonconvexities. It might be speculated that multiple equilibria exist, 
whereby processors that receive a relatively smooth supply of milk with relatively constant 
shares of higher-quality milk over the year are in a better position to market higher-value 
products. These firms then may have stronger incentives to encourage further deseasonali-
zation of milk production to develop their market for the higher-valued products. Other 
firms may conclude that it is futile to compete with entrenched market leaders possessed of 
an endowed advantage in the nature of raw milk supplies. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Irish milk seasonality, 1997-2000: quantity and price 
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In this paper we investigate a third possibility that may influence the persistence of 
quantity seasonality in milk production: that E.U. policy may be a contributing factor. 
Before formalizing our argument, we will outline the nature of the policies at issue.5 CAP 
subsidies on private storage are supported for meat and dairy products. As of May 2002, 
regulations 2771/99, 1362/87, and 2659/94 stipulate the respective conditions for butter, 
skim milk powder (SMP), and cheeses. In the case of butter and cream, the storage period 
is March 15 through August 15, while the SMP scheme also is most likely to be triggered 
during peak seasonal production. The subsidies take the form of a fixed amount per ton 
sequestered, a daily rate per ton, and an interest rate subsidy. 
The European Union also is empowered to intervene directly in butter and SMP mar-
kets. For butter, intervention is triggered when market prices fall below 90 percent of the 
reference intervention price, and intervention purchases are suspended when market prices 
exceed 92 percent of the reference price. Low market prices also trigger intervention in 
SMP markets, but such interventions can only occur between March 1 and August 31.6 
Next, we develop a two-season model, with high-cost and low-cost seasons, that teases out 
the effects of storage subsidies and milk product market interventions on seasonality in 
production and consumption. 
 
3. Storage Subsidies and Product Market Interventions 
3.1. Model 
For the sake of simplicity we hold that the milk production year can be divided into 
two seasons, each of equal duration. Respective output levels ˆa  =  q  +  q f  and 
ˆ
b  =  q  -  q f  are produced in seasons A and B, where the levels of qˆ  and f  shall be 
endogenous to our model.7 We label f  the production seasonality index because it can be 
viewed as an index of deterministic variability in production. And qˆ , being the nonsea-
sonal component of production per season, is labeled the production index. Without 
compromising our argument, the intertemporal interest rate is assumed to have zero 
value. The market is perfectly competitive, and there are three categories of agents. 
In the first category we have the producers and, in the aggregate, their annual cost 
function for inputs other than those where unit costs vary by season. Typically, feed, 
fertilizer, labor, and some parts of utility bills can be represented by the twice continu-
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ously differentiable and strictly convex function ˆ ˆ( )R q + , qf - f  which is defined on 2+¡ .8 
This function is held to be permutation symmetric in the sense that 
2
a ) ( ) ( )q 1 b 2 a 2 b 1 1 2R(  = ,  =   =  R  = ,  =   ,   q q q q q q q q q +" Î¡  where 1q  and 2q  are evaluations 
of the two arguments. Because we have factored out the seasonal cost component, we 
believe that symmetry and convexity are quite intuitive assumptions. Together, the 
assumptions imply that unbalanced seasonal production carries with it a cost penalty, but 
the penalty is independent of whether the larger amount is produced in season A or 
season B. For management costs and for the maintenance costs of such things as provid-
ing water, electricity, bulk tanks, and an adequate parlour, this seems reasonable.9 
Unit seasonal costs are given, again in deviations form, by 12 ( )am  =   m - r  and bm =   
1
2 ( ) m  +  r  where 0    r ³  and 0m    >  - r , so that season A may be thought of as the 
(exogenously determined) low-cost summer grazing season. While m, which is a nonsea-
sonal marginal cost, might be subsumed in ( )1 2R , q q , we will use it as a parameterization 
of nonseasonal marginal costs. Thus, aggregated over all producers, total on-farm produc-
tion costs are given by the expression  
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a bR q + , q   +  q +    +  q   =  R q + , q    +  mqm mf - f f - f f - f -rf . 
Here we may think of  r f  as the cost savings that are gleaned from managerial adjust-
ments of qˆ  and f  to take best advantage of r . 
The next category of agents is the processors. In the aggregate, their annual cost 
function can be represented by ˆ ˆ( )D q + , qf - f . This, too, is held to be twice continuously 
differentiable, symmetric, and strictly convex. In order to economize on expression 
lengths at a later juncture, we write ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) )C q + , q    =  D q + , q    +  R(q + , q  f - f f - f f - f , 
and note that it, too, is symmetric and convex. 
 
ASSUMPTION 1. Cost function ( )a bC , q q  is symmetric and strictly convex. 
 
Finally, in the third category, we have the consumers. Our concern is mainly with 
production seasonality, for it is there that most of the seasonality in animal agriculture 
arises.10 In our quest to understand the interactions between seasonality and policy, we 
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assume temporal separability and season invariant demand. In addition, we will often 
assume a linear inverse demand equation, 0 1P(q)  = qa - a  where 0 10 0 > , >a a , and 
0P(q)  >  for all quantities of interest. 
 
ASSUMPTION 2. The demand function is temporally separable, and season invariant. 
 
ASSUMPTION 2¢. The demand function is linear, temporally separable, and season invariant. 
 
It bears emphasizing that seasonality does not originate on the demand side, where 
season invariant preferences underpin the season invariant inverse demand function given 
by the strictly decreasing function ( )P q . While, as we will show, consumers may behave 
in a seasonal manner, this is an equilibrium response to production-side cost seasonality. 
It is important to note that there is no uncertainty in our model, and our interest is 
only in an analysis of stationary equilibrium. Thus, while intertemporal product transfers 
may occur, they will be confined within some replicating year-long interval. If we 
identify consumption in season V as cvq , then a stationary equilibrium requires that 
ˆ ˆ ˆ2c ca b  +    =  q  +    +  q      =  qq q f - f . In order to provide a convenient interpretation of the 
results that we will shortly establish, we write consumptions in deviation form, with 
ˆc
a  =  q  +  q d  and ˆ
c
b  =  q    q - d . As well, d  may be interpreted as an endogenous index of 
seasonality in consumption. The season A difference between production and consump-
tion, i.e.,     f - d , represents the amount of product transferred over seasons through 
storage. Finally, let the unit cost of storage be 0s > .11 
To review, note that we have developed and parameterized three concepts of season-
ality. Two are endogenous: production seasonality as given by index f  and consumption 
seasonality as given by index d . The third, exogenous cost seasonality as represented by 
index r , is the technology parameter that motivates seasonal patterns in behavior. 
Subject to one qualification, we can now write the expression for aggregate profit on 
the supply side, i.e., profit summed over all producers and all processors and over both 
periods, as  
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ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
     ,  , q  = P q     q   + P q +  q +    - s 
 C q + , q      mq +   .
P d f - d - d d d - f d
- f - f - r f
 (1) 
System convexity is assured by the strict convexity of ˆ ˆ( )C q + , q  f - f . The qualification 
is that storage costs actually amount to | |   sf - d , and we have not yet established that 
    f ³ d . We will shortly provide conditions under which this is true. But before we do so, 
we take the liberty of assuming it so as to describe optimal behavior. 
Notice that payments to farmers are transfer payments that net out in expression (1). 
Further, suppose that the socially optimal signals are sent from processors to producers. 
Then we may invoke the first fundamental welfare theorem (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green, 1995) because we know that competitive markets will then support the optimized 
choices of arguments ˆ( ), , qd f . And so, for the general demand structure given in  
Assumption 2, we have the price-taking optimality conditions: 
 1 2
1 2
ˆ ˆ( ) : ) ( ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( ) ( ) (
a     P(q      P q +   s = ,
b        s  q  +  ,  q     + q  +  ,  q     +  =  ,C C
c   q   P q     + P q  +    q  +  ,  q      q  +  ,  q  C C
d - d - d -
f - - f - f f - f r
- d d - f - f - f - ) 0    m = ,f -
 (2) 
where ( )i a b, q qC  is the differential with respect to the ith argument.
12 We have not 
presented the complementary slackness conditions because it is assumed that the solution 
is interior. From the law of demand, (2a) implies that d > 0 for all s > 0. 
Condition (2a), the arbitrage criterion, is just the assertion that arbitrage opportuni-
ties do not exist, i.e., if it pays to store, then storage will occur until the price differential 
eliminates the profits from putting an extra unit into storage. Note in particular that if s = 
0 then d = 0. Condition (2b), the allocation criterion, represents the exhaustion of cost 
efficiencies associated with transferring production from the high-cost period to the low-
cost period. Condition (2c), the production criterion, represents the equation of summed 
marginal revenues and summed marginal costs due to a ray expansion of output, i.e., 
change aq  and bq  by the same small amount. 
At this point, we invoke a result from the theory of majorization (Marshall and 
Olkin, 1979; Chambers and Quiggin, 1997 and 2000). For a permutation symmetric, 
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convex, continuously differentiable function, ( ): ,ng z  I ®
r ¡  where nI  is the convex 
interval product domain of relevance, the Ostrowski condition asserts that13  
 ( )[ ( ) ( )] 0 (1 , )i j i j z z    z,  i, j   ,  ng gz z- - ³ " " Î
r r r K  (3) 
is true. This inequality is of interest because we may employ it to rewrite (2b) above as 
 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( , ) ( )] 0s = q+ q q  ,q    .C Cr - f f - f - + f - f f ³  (4) 
Having made this observation, we can show the following. 
 
RESULT 1. Under Assumption 1, if 0> s >r  and s is sufficiently small, then 0>f ³ d . 
Therefore, objective function (1) is well posed. 
 
All proofs are provided in the Appendix.14 It has already been assumed that there is 
cost seasonality, 0>r . Result 1 demonstrates that storage from the low-cost season to 
the high-cost season will occur when arbitrage profits are possible, i.e., when the stronger 
inequality   >  sr  pertains. It merits observation that cost seasonality induces endogenous 
consumption seasonality, but consumption seasonality is tempered by the extent of the 
storage infrastructure. 
Note that system (2) is possessed of some peculiarities that can be exploited in the 
analysis to follow. In particular, only endogenous variables qˆ  and d  arise in (2a) while 
only variables qˆ  and f  arise in (2b). Upon specializing to Assumption 2¢, linearity in 
demand generates the following system: 
 
1
1 2
1 20 1
( ) : 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ,  ) )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : 2 2 ( )- ( )
a       = s,
b      q+ q  + (q + ,  q  = s ,C C
c   q    q q + ,  q q+ ,  q  = m.C C
¢ d a d
¢ f - f - f f - f - r
¢ a - a - f - f f - f
 (2¢) 
Linear demand is helpful because system (2¢) has become block separable, where 
(2¢a¢) determines the value of d  and the other two equations jointly determine the values 
of qˆ  and f . 
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3.2. Storage Subsidies and Seasonality 
3.2.1. No Quota 
Focusing on block (2¢b¢)-(2¢c¢), storage costs arise only in (2¢b¢). And the seasonality 
parameter enters in exactly the same manner so that, from the perspective of equilibrium 
determination, s and -r are indistinguishable. Comparative statics on the system immedi-
ately yield the following, which will be used as reference points for later deductions. 
 
RESULT 2. Under assumptions 1 (i.e., symmetric, convex cost) and 2¢ (i.e., linear 
demand): 
a. ˆ ˆ0 [ ( )] 0 0d /ds   , d P(q ) P q + /ds , d /dm =d ³ - d - d ³ d  and 
ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )] 0d P q P q + /dm = - d - d . That is, both consumption seasonality and the 
peak-trough price difference are decreasing in a storage subsidy. They are unaf-
fected by either a change in the level of cost seasonality or a change in the level of 
nonseasonal costs. 
b. 0d /dsf £  and 0d /d   f r ³ . That is, production seasonality increases under a stor-
age subsidy or an increase in cost seasonality. 
c. ˆ 0dq/dm £ . That is, production decreases with an increase in nonseasonal costs. 
d. ˆdq/d  d /dmr = - f . That is, the effect of a small increase in seasonal costs on non-
seasonal production equals the effect of a small decrease in nonseasonal costs on 
production seasonality. 
 
As these deductions are largely in accord with intuition, we will not dwell upon them. 
Notice, however, that we have related little about the effects of cost seasonality or a storage 
subsidy on the overall level of production, qˆ . Part (d), which may be interpreted as a 
duality-type reciprocity result on the moments of milk supply, does impart some informa-
tion. But no regularity assumptions made thus far allow us to sign either side of the 
equation.15 In fact, the effects can go either way. Suppose that the nonseasonal production 
technology is symmetric, being of the form * ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )a b a b a bC , = C   +  C   +   ,     q q q q q qg g Î ¡ . 
From work underlying Result 2, the following transpires. 
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RESULT 3. Under assumptions 1 and 2¢, let ( )a bC , q q  have the form 
*( )a bC , q q . Then: 
a.   ˆ ( ) 0dq/ds ³ £  whenever 111ˆ ( ) ( ) 0 0C q      q³ £ " ³ . That is, the level of produc-
tion increases (decreases) with either a storage subsidy or an increase in cost 
seasonality whenever 111ˆ ( ) ( ) 0 0C q     q£ ³ " ³ . 
b.   ( ) 0d /dm f ³ £  whenever 111ˆ ( ) ( ) 0 0C q    q £ ³ " ³ . That is, the level of produc-
tion seasonality, f , increases (decreases) with an increase in nonseasonal costs 
whenever marginal cost is convex (concave). 
c.    ˆ( ) 0dP q /ds- d ³  if 111ˆ ( ) 0 0C q     q  £ " ³ , while ˆ( ) 0dP q + /ds  d £  if 
111
ˆ ( ) 0 0C q      q  ³ " ³ . That is, the peak price decreases (trough price increases) 
with a storage subsidy if marginal cost is concave (convex). 
d.    ˆ( ) ( ) 0dP q /d  - d r ³ £  whenever 111ˆ ( ) ( ) 0 0C q     q ³ £ " ³  and 
ˆ( ) ( ) 0dP q + /d  d r ³ £  whenever 111ˆ ( ) ( ) 0 0C q    q  ³ £ " ³ . That is, both peak 
and trough prices increase (decrease) with an increase in cost seasonality when-
ever marginal cost is concave (convex). 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the case where 111ˆ ( ) 0 0C q    q  ³ " ³ . The figure stresses three pro-
duction points; q, q + 2t, and q + 4t, where t > 0. The midpoints of the segments (q, q + 
2t) and (q + 2t, q + 4t) are also identified on the horizontal axis. For each midpoint, the 
vertical gap between the segment evaluation and the cost function evaluation is quantified 
on the vertical axis. This vertical gap reflects the increase in cost due to a two-point 
spread in production away from the segment midpoint. For example, the smaller vertical 
gap reflects the increase in nonseasonal costs associated with producing q + 2t in season 
A and q in season B rather than q + t in each season. The claim we make is that condition 
111
ˆ 0 0C (q)     q³ " ³  implies that, upon taking the limit as 0t    ® , the vertical gap is larger 
on segment (q + 2t, q + 4t) than on segment (q, q + 2t). To demonstrate, we can write 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ( )]t  = C q + 4t +C q + 2t 2C q + 3t  C q + 2t +C q 2 C q + tF - - - . (5) 
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FIGURE 4. Characterizing a function with convex marginal cost 
 
 
Upon differentiating and evaluating at t = 0, we have 1 11( 0) 0 ( 0) 0t = = , t = =F F , and 
111( 0)t = F  111ˆ12 ( 0)=   C t = . The intuition that Figure 4 provides is that variability in 
production is more costly at higher levels of output than at lower levels of output. 
Intuition for part (a) in Result 3 can be obtained by observing that a storage subsidy 
allows a more complete integration of the two markets. We saw, in Result 2(b), that a 
storage subsidy elevates temporal variation in production. Production decisions are made 
at the margin. If marginal cost is convex, then “expected” marginal cost increases with 
the advent of a storage subsidy. In this case, the incentive to produce is depressed. And 
that is precisely the economic content of Result 3(a). Production seasonality and the level 
of production are complements if marginal cost, suitably separated, is concave. Then a 
subsidy on, say, winter housing or winter fodder would reduce both production seasonal-
ity and the scale of production. 
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Borrowing terminology from Kimball (1990), a technology *( )a bC , q q  such that 
111
ˆ ( ) 0C q   £  is said to be prudent. Kimball’s concern was with how uncertainty and risk 
preferences affect savings behavior. Abstracting from the context, our problem possesses 
a formal similarity. Whereas Kimball studied how preference structures affect the defer-
ral of (expected) consumption, we study how technology affects the deferral of 
production. In the face of higher storage costs, it is prudent to decrease the intensity of 
production whenever 111ˆ ( ) 0 0C q    q £ " ³ . This is because, for such a cost technology, 
seasonality in production keeps the marginal cost of production down while we know 
from Result 2(b) that higher storage costs reduce seasonal production behavior. 
As for part (b), we know from Result 2(c) that production decreases with an increase 
in nonseasonal costs. If ˆ ( )C q  is more convex at low output than at high output, then the 
incentive to vary production by season falls with an increase in parameter m. To bring the 
result toward a practical illustration, suppose that the cost of permanently employed labor 
increased. Then, for 111ˆ ( ) 0 0C q     q £ " ³ , both the equilibrium level of production and 
equilibrium production seasonality would fall. The effect on seasonality would provide a 
modicum of compensation for processors seeking a more stable supply of milk. Suppose 
it were true that large-scale and small-scale producers differ only by the draw from a 
mass distribution function of marginal cost m, ( ):F m  + +®¡ ¡  with ( ) 0dF m /dm ³ . 
Then, for costs of form *( )C q , an empirical observation that qˆ  and f  are negatively 
correlated across production units would provide evidence to support the hypothesis that 
111
ˆ ( ) 0 0C q     q ³ " ³ . The value of stabilized production would be larger for larger produc-
ers, say with draw ml, than for smaller producers with draw s s l,   >  m m m .16 
Part (c) is due to the fact that qˆ  increases with a decline in storage costs under the 
condition 111ˆ ( ) 0 0C q     q  £ " ³ . When impediments to interseasonal transfers of production 
fall, then it seems natural that more of the larger overall level of output will be consumed 
in season B. Under condition 111ˆ ( ) 0C q    ³ "  0q ³ , the overall level of production de-
creases with a decline in s. More of what remains is allocated to season B, so that the 
trough price must increase. 
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Part (d) is a consequence of part (a). Part (a) identifies conditions under which an in-
crease in cost seasonality increases the overall production level. The change in 
production is distributed over seasons and has the same qualitative impact on both season 
price levels. Notice, though, that while s and –r have the same qualitative impacts on qˆ , 
they do not necessarily have the same qualitative impacts on season prices. This is 
because s has a dual role in guiding production and consumption while the role of r is 
focused on guiding production.  
Precise conditions can be placed on the cost function such that mean production is 
invariant to the storage subsidy. Specifically, suppose that17  
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1111
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0 ( ) 0 0; (0) 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0
a b a b
1
    C q + , q  = G q  + H  = G   +   + H    ,q q q q
    q   , q  >    q   H  = , H  = H  ,       .G G H
f - f f -
³ " ³ f - f f ³ " f ³
 (6) 
Then the following is readily established. 
 
RESULT 4. Under assumptions 1 and 2¢, let ( )a bC , q q  be of form (6). Then 
a. ˆ 0dq/ds  = . That is, the level of production, qˆ , is invariant to a storage subsidy 
or a change in cost seasonality. 
b. 0d /dm  =f . That is, the level of production seasonality, f , is invariant to a 
change in nonseasonal costs. 
 
These conclusions convey that an additively separable cost function, as given in 
specification (6), permits the moments of the production path to respond differently. The 
production index is insensitive to seasonality in costs, while the production seasonality 
index is insensitive to nonseasonal costs.18 
It is interesting to compare Result 3 with Result 4. Because the costs of changing the 
moments of production activities were not separated in cost specification *( )C q , changes 
in the cost environment that should have a direct impact on a particular moment, either 
average level or the extent of seasonality, had an indirect impact on the other moment. 
This indirect effect does not occur in Result 4.19 
16 / Hennessy and Roosen 
To summarize this subsection, we have shown that the extent of temporal integration 
matters when seeking to understand how the economic and policy environment affects 
equilibrium. In our model, and regardless of technology asymmetries, price seasonality 
would disappear if storage costs were zero. Price seasonality would also disappear, 
regardless of storage costs, if there were no technology asymmetries. The nature of the 
technology also matters in more subtle ways. The cost function may express increasing, 
neutral, or decreasing technological preferences for seasonality as overall output in-
creases. Results 3 and 4 present implications of these structural attributes for equilibrium.  
3.2.2. Quota 
Milk marketing quotas have been in place in the European Union since 1984. In this 
section we modify our more general model to accommodate this policy. We do so by 
fixing the level of production, qˆ , in welfare measure (1). In addition we make the follow-
ing assumption. 
 
ASSUMPTION 3. Markets for production rights are efficient, and quota is binding. 
 
Then the optimality conditions are 
 
2
ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( ) 01
a      P q P q+  s = ,  
b        s  q+ ,  q  + q+ ,  q  +  = .C C
d - d - d -
f - - f - f f - f r
 (2²) 
Dispensing with our linear demand assumption, we may present an omnibus result. 
 
RESULT 5. Make assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Then: 
a. ˆ/ 0 ( ) /d ds    dP q  dsd ³ ³ + d , ˆ( ) / 0dP q ds  - d ³ , and / 0d ds f £ . That is, a stor-
age subsidy decreases consumption seasonality and increases production 
seasonality. Consequently, peak price decreases and trough price increases 
with a storage subsidy. 
b. / / 0d dm d dmd = f = . That is, a nonseasonal change in marginal costs has no 
effect on either consumption seasonality or production seasonality. 
c. / 0 /d d  d df r ³ = d r . That is, an increase in cost seasonality increases produc-
tion seasonality but has no effect on consumption seasonality. 
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d. ˆ/ ( ) 0d dq   d ³ £  if 11( ) ( ) 0q      q    P +³ £ " Î ¡ , while ˆ ˆ( ) / 0dP q dq - d £  and 
ˆ ˆ( ) / 0dP q  dq + d £  regardless. That is, an increase in the level of quota increases 
(decreases) consumption seasonality if the inverse demand function is convex 
(concave). Further, both peak and trough prices fall with an increase in the 
level of quota.  
e. let *( , ) ( , )a b a bC       q q q qC=  as in Result 3. Then ˆ/ ( ) 0d dq  f ³ £  if 
111
ˆ ( ) ( ) 0 0C q      q£ ³ " > . That is, production seasonality increases (decreases) 
with an increase in the level of quota if marginal cost is concave (convex). 
f. let ( , )a bC  q q  assume the form given in equation (6). Then ˆ/ 0d dqf = . That is, 
production seasonality is invariant to the level of quota. 
 
Parts (a) through (c) are obvious, so we will not dwell upon them except to relate 
that any increase in nonseasonal costs would be absorbed in quota shadow rents. As for 
part (d), if production increases, then prices fall in both seasons. If the inverse demand 
function is convex, then price becomes less sensitive to quantity variability. To support 
interseasonal arbitrage, a larger spread in consumption patterns must emerge. Part (e) 
may be motivated in a manner similar to Result 3(b), except more directly. Production 
level and production seasonality are complements in production when 
111
ˆ ( ) 0 0C q     q >£ " . In the case of Result 5(f), the moments of production are, by design, 
additively separable. 
Recapitulating this study of storage subsidies in a quota-regulated regime, as with the 
absence of quota restrictions it continues to be true that such subsidies act to decrease 
consumption seasonality and increase production seasonality. The effect of the aggregate 
quota level on consumption seasonality depends, however, on the curvature of the inverse 
demand function. This is because of the way in which storage costs and the demand 
function interact in distributing consumption across seasons. The effect of quota level on 
production seasonality is determined by whether the cost penalty for variability increases 
or decreases with an increase in overall output. A comparison of Result 5 with the 
findings in subsection 3.2.1. shows that the linear demand assumption is not trivial. 
Linear demand plays the same role on the consumption side as cost specification (6) does 
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on the production side. It requires that the level of consumption has no effect on seasonal-
ity in consumption. In subsection 3.2.2, we can accommodate a more general demand 
environment because the production environment is simplified when quota fixes the 
overall level of production. 
 
3.3. Product Market Intervention 
Here, the regulator takes product off the market when the product price is low, i.e.,  
in season A. In contrast to storage market intervention, the context of a product market 
intervention policy needs further clarification before engaging in an analysis. Specifi-
cally, it is necessary to assert what happens to the removed product. Either it is placed 
back on the market later or it does not reappear on the market. In the latter case, it might 
be placed on the animal feed market, as is often the case with SMP. Or subsidies may be 
paid, by the taxpayer at large, in order to place the product on world food markets. 
Alternatively, the removed product might be destroyed. 
If removed product is placed back on the market in season B, then, at least in our 
model, private storage will be crowded out one-for-one until public storage exceeds 
optimal storage and arbitrage constraint 2(a) no longer holds. Up to the point where there 
is complete crowding out, however, the production patterns of interest to this research are 
not affected. If the product is permanently removed from its primary market, then there 
will be implications for the level and seasonality of both equilibrium production and 
equilibrium price. Because permanent removal has more significant economic implica-
tions than does temporary removal, in the analysis to follow we consider only product 
market interventions under which the product is not placed back in the same market later. 
3.3.1. No Quota 
The policy takes the form of product removal of amount k  in surplus season A. 
This product is destroyed immediately after removal. So qˆ  +  f  is produced in that 
season and qˆ  +  d  is consumed in that season. Surplus production amounts to f - d . 
Upon removing k , the amount  f - d - k  is stored for consumption in season B. 
Adding stored production to season B production, qˆ - f , we have that qˆ - d - k  is 
placed on the market in season B. In season A, qˆ  +    +  d k  disappears from the market 
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through consumption or (paid) removal. Consequently, season A industry receipts are 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )P q +  q  +    +  d d k  where price must be consistent with consumption qˆ  +  d . 
Season B industry receipts are ˆ ˆ( ) ( )P q  q- d - k - d - k . Aggregate industry welfare, 
summed over producers and processors, is  
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
     ,  ,  q,   = P q  q  
+ P q  +   q +  +  s  C(q  +  ,  q  -  ) - m q +   .
P d f k - d - k - d - k
d d k - f - d - k - f f r f
 (7) 
We see that mean consumption over the two periods is ˆ 0.5q - k , with consumption 
deviations of the form 0.5  +  d k  and 0.5-d- k  so that the amplitude of the consumption 
pattern is 2   +  d k . The cost to the policymaker of the product removal policy is 
ˆ( )P q + d k . Product destruction costs have been assumed to be negligible. 
Optimization over the three choice variables, and making the linear demand assump-
tion, identifies the equilibrium conditions  
 
1
1 2
1 20 1 1
( ) : 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : 2 2 ( ) ( )
a        +  = s/ ,  
b       q  +  ,  q  + q  +  ,  q  = s ,C C
c   q    q + q  +  ,  q q  +  ,  q  = m.C C
d d k a
f - f - f f - f - r
a - a a k - f - f - f - f
 (8) 
Notice that the amplitude of consumption is given on the left-hand side of (8a). A study 
of this system provides the following. 
 
RESULT 6. Make assumptions 1 and 2¢ under a product removal policy. Then: 
a. ˆ ˆ(2 ) / 0, / 0, ( ) / 0d   d  dq d  dP q dd + k k = k ³ - d k ³ , and ˆ( ) / 0dP q  d  + d k ³ . That 
is, product removal has no effect on consumption seasonality, increases pro-
duction, and increases price in both seasons. 
b. let *( , ) ( , )a b a bC   q q q qC=  as in Result 3. Then / ( ) 0d df k ³ £  if 
111
ˆ ( ) ( ) 0 0C q      q£ ³ " > . That is, production seasonality increases (decreases) 
with an increase in the level of product removal if marginal cost is concave 
(convex). 
c. let ( , )a bC  q q  assume the form given in equation (6). Then / 0d d   f k = . That is, 
production seasonality is invariant to the level of product removal. 
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The opportunity to smooth consumption that is afforded by storage infrastructure takes 
much of the bite out of a policy that would seem to be targeted at altering seasonal behav-
ior. Indeed, the policy does not affect consumption seasonality or price seasonality when 
demand is linear. And, as some additional algebra would show, the price impacts due to 
nonlinear inverse demand could increase or decrease price seasonality. Predictably, overall 
production is elevated by the intervention policy because the storage link requires that all 
prices rise together. Thus, assuming that storage markets function adequately, the season-
specific intervention policy should be seen as a pure price support mechanism rather than 
as an attempt to redress any seasonality related “disturbances” or disequilibria. 
Concerning parts (b) and (c), at first blush it might appear that removals targeted in 
the high production season would only exacerbate production seasonality. Again, how-
ever, market integration through storage requires that production incentives increase in 
both seasons, and any bias toward the low-cost season would have little to do with pure 
price incentives. Rather, the bias would emerge largely as a consequence of the nature of 
the underlying production technology. 
To review the effects of production removal under linear demand, the overall price 
level is supported and the level of consumption seasonality is not affected by the policy. 
Production seasonality may rise or fall, but intertemporal arbitrage through storage 
ensures that consumption seasonality is not affected. 
3.3.2. Quota 
As in subsection 3.2.2., in this section we fix the level of production, qˆ . But we do 
not impose Assumption 2¢, so that system (8) becomes  
 
1 2
( ) : ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( )
* ** *a      P  P  +  = s,  q q
b       q  +  ,  q  + q  +  ,  q  = s ,C C
d - -d d
f - f - f f - f - r
 (8¢) 
where ˆ 0.5*  =  q q - k  and 0.5*  =    +  d kd . A study of this system establishes the following. 
 
RESULT 7. Make assumptions 1, 2, and 3 under a product removal policy. Then 
( )*d /d  k £ ³d  0 if 11( ) ( ) 0q      q    P +³ £ " Î ¡ , and 0d /d  = f k  regardless. That is, an 
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increase in the level of removed product decreases (increases) consumption seasonality if the 
inverse demand function is convex (concave). It has no effect on production seasonality. 
The effects of altered production quota are the same as in Result 5 and warrant no fur-
ther discussion. When compared with a storage subsidy, observe that product removal is a 
more targeted policy instrument in that it does not alter production patterns under a quota 
regime. Absent production control, the effect of product removal on production seasonality 
was only as a side effect of alternating the incentive to change overall production. Whether 
the greater focus of the instrument is good or bad depends on what the policymaker seeks 
to achieve, and we are not in a position to suggest the better instrument. 
 
4. Discussion 
Seasonality in production is one of the peculiarities of many agricultural activities. 
Its consequences at the market level are a concern for producers, processors, and policy-
makers. The consequences may also be a concern for consumers, particularly consumers 
in countries where transportation and storage infrastructure do not function well.20 Yet 
little has been written on the production economics of seasonality. 
Our goal in this paper has been to understand the determinants of endogenous sea-
sonal production. From a policy perspective, this is an issue in animal agriculture as it 
applies to Northwest Europe. Yet, and perhaps partly because the pathways of endoge-
nous seasonal production are not well understood, there would seem to be confusion 
about how policy might affect storage as well as seasonal aspects of production, con-
sumption, and price. 
Using tools appropriate for accommodating asymmetries in seasonal production en-
vironments, we have developed a simple yet versatile market level model of seasonal 
production when product can be stored. It quickly becomes obvious, when applying the 
model to study a subsidy on the private storage of milk products, that dampened price 
seasonality is traded off against amplified production seasonality. In the absence of quota 
limits, production may rise or fall with the storage subsidy. Product market removals 
support the level of product price and the incentive to produce. Determinate effects on 
these seasonality indices can be identified if we are prepared to speculate about the true 
nature of demand and cost technologies. Because we have found that plausible assump-
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tions on the production technology and the market-level demand can support a variety of 
market-level production patterns, empirical studies will be required if implications are to 
be drawn for policy formation. 
Our analysis suggests that E.U. policy on agricultural seasonality has not been 
clearly thought through. Are season-varying policy interventions and aid for private 
storage really intended solely as income support policies? If not, what are the negative 
externalities associated with seasonality? Are they most directly associated with quantity 
seasonalities or with price seasonality? Seasonal production may have adverse food 
safety implications, but aids to private storage will only exacerbate the problem, and 
product market intervention might also add to the harm. Seasonal consumption might 
have implications for balance in diets among citizens of E.U. countries. But consump-
tion-side pressure groups do not appear to motivate the policies. And what, specifically, 
might the nature of any consumption-side externalities be? 
Returning to the empirical evidence on seasonal trends in milk production, but away 
from policy issues, several conjectures warrant formal and empirical investigation. It 
would seem that dairy innovations in feed sources, in housing, and in reproduction 
technologies have possessed a bias toward reducing seasonality. How might any seasonal 
biases in innovations be measured, and are the incentives in place for commercial com-
panies to research and develop seasonality-reducing technologies? Might distance from 
the market be a factor in Ireland’s persistent quantity seasonality? The Netherlands is also 
a significant dairy product exporter, and yet production seasonality is not as strong there. 
In 2000, its standard deviation of shares in monthly production was 0.037, a number that 
is somewhat less than that of Ireland (0.044) but substantially larger than the standard 
deviations in the United Kingdom (0.006) and France (0.009). The dairy product profile 
produced in the Netherlands is more market oriented, with stronger emphases on cream 
and whole milk products rather than storable butter and milk powders. Dutch production 
practices are also quite different from those in Ireland. It seems natural to ask whether 
cost seasonality might interact with the incentives to add value in determining the amount 
and variety of dairy processing. More broadly, are there multiple possible equilibria such 
that a concerted effort, at a national or processor level, might achieve a superior self-
sustaining pattern of industry activities? 
  
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 1. We have pointed to several problems that arise from seasonality. But, of course, we 
are not suggesting that all give rise to suboptimal welfare given the available tech-
nology set. Food safety issues, when combined with imperfect information, will 
likely generate negative externalities. Then there may be a role for policy interven-
tions that seek to deseasonalize production. The cost technologies that underlie 
seasonal production do not, however, in themselves constitute externalities. This dis-
tinction would not appear to be recognized in most discussions on policy 
interventions to alter seasonal patterns in prices, production, and consumption. 
2. Research by, e.g., Crosse, O’Brien, and Ryan (2000), and Ryan, Crosse, and Fitzger-
ald (2000) highlight the feasibility of autumn-calving herd management in Ireland 
and suggest possible adjustments to alter production. 
3. See Allen and Lueck 1998 for interesting insights on trends toward nonseasonal 
production in animal agriculture. In the case of dairying, Caine and Stonehouse 
(1983) refer to studies that identify a deseasonalizing bias in progressive husbandry 
practices. An argument could be made that artificial insemination promotes seasonal-
ity by allowing the producer to concentrate calving activities in a small time interval 
so that dedicated staff and resources can be made available. At the market level, any 
such endeavors to concentrate calving will likely be lost as different firms spread 
calving over time so that any economic rents from a particular choice of calving    
period are exhausted. 
4. Milk production seasonality is also an issue in the United States. Washington, 
Lawson, and Kilmer (2000) document that Florida dairy cooperatives have faced a 
supplier production peak/trough ratio of 1.35 to 1.40 in the early 1990s. These coop-
eratives have sought to reduce production seasonality by implementing a voluntary 
seasonal pricing schedule. 
5. For a review of the CAP, see European Commission 1997, 1999; or Agra Europe 
2002. 
6. The European Union also operates a deseasonalization premium for beef slaughter. If 
autumn slaughter of male bovines exceeds 35 percent of annual slaughter, then a pre-
mium of between 18 and 73 Euro per head is paid per male bovine slaughtered 
during the spring. 
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7. There is a large body of insightful work on agricultural production that might be 
labeled as two-season models, e.g., Innes 1993 and Saha 1994. These generally deal 
with crop production, where there is a growing season and a nongrowing season. Natu-
rally, the issue of endogenous production seasonality is precluded by construction. 
8. The aggregate cost function must be consistent with the firm-level cost functions, 
and it is unlikely to be a linear sum of firm-level cost functions. See, e.g., Chambers 
1988 on cost function aggregation. 
9. Most costs have a seasonal component. To distinguish between seasonal and nonsea-
sonal components of some function 1 2( )g , q q , one might remove the largest 
symmetric convex function among the set of symmetric and convex functions 
1 2( )h , SCq q Î , i.e., 
*
1 2 1 2 1 2( )  max{ ( , ) : ( , )  h , = h gq q q q q q ³  2 1 2( ) ( ) }1h , , h , SCq q q q Î . 
Residual *1 2 1 2( ) ( )g ,  h , q q q q-  might be defined as the seasonal component of costs. 
10. Turkeys and Easter lamb are the obvious exceptions. In any case, our model can be 
readily adapted to study seasonality that originates on the demand side. 
11. Linearity of storage costs is not a trivial assumption. As will be seen later, the 
assumption allows a measure of separation between production and consumption. 
12. Higher-order derivatives are represented in the obvious way. For example, we will 
denote by ( )ijh ×  the second derivative of ( )h ×  with respect to the ith and jth argu-
ments. 
13. “Permutation symmetric” means that the function value is invariant under any 
interchange in the value of a pair of arguments. For example, 
1 2 3 2 1 3( ) ( )g , , = g , , z z z z z z  for any admissible value of the triple. Also, ( )g z
r
 need not 
be convex for relation (3) to hold. Given symmetry, the less restrictive condition of 
“Schur-convex” suffices. 
14. One may wonder why symmetry is assumed when Result 1 (and also other results to 
follow) may seem so intuitive. Indeed, were it assumed that 12 0 ( )a bC =   , q q"  then 
more conventional conditions on marginal cost functions would immediately yield 
the finding. However, when 12 0C ¹ , then a change in either argument affects both 
marginal cost functions, and intuition developed for unidimensional functions does 
not apply. 
15. See Silberberg 1978 (p. 290) on reciprocity. 
16. We consider f , and not ˆ/qf , to be the measure of seasonality. So the coefficient of 
variation would be even more stable as the draw on m decreases and the scale of 
production increases.  
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17. The functional form in (6) is d’Alambert’s representation of the general solution to the 
wave equation. See p. 658 of Kreyszig 1988. The multiplier ½ is to introduce into 
functions ( )G ×  and ( )H ×  in order to convert the arguments into a mean and deviation 
format. 
18. One might view specification (6) as the cost seasonality analog to the Just and Pope 
(1978) specification of stochastic primal production technologies. 
19. Part (a) of Result 3 suggests that cost functions that satisfy 111ˆ ( ) 0 0C q =    q  " ³  
should have special significance. This is the set of quadratic cost functions, and an 
appeal to continuity would suggest the intuition that the conclusions of Result 4 
should also pertain for cost functions of the form 0 1ˆ ( )C q          qt t= +  
2
2   qt+ . In fact, 
quadratic cost functions comprise a special case of specification (6). To illustrate, set 
0t  1 0= =t  with 2 1=t . Then write 
2 2 2( 2)a b a b a b        q q q q q q+ º + - º  
2ˆ4q  
ˆ ˆ2( ) ( )q  q- + f - f 2 2ˆ2 2qº + f  so that 2ˆ ˆ( ) 2G q = q ,  2( )H = 2f f , and all the conditions 
in specification (6) are satisfied.  
20. One school of thought in Economic History holds that the nature of production 
seasonality in agriculture can be an important determinant of the path toward eco-
nomic development (Sokoloff and Dollar, 1997). 
  
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Result 1. From relation (4), if   >  sr  then 0  f ³ . From equation (2b), 
  >  sr  implies that 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )q + , q > q + , qC Cf - f f - f . Given symmetry and strict convex-
ity, this is inconsistent with 0  =f . To see the inconsistency, write ( )L =f  
1 ˆ ˆ( )q + , qC f - f  2 ˆ ˆ( )q + , qC- f - f  so that L(0) = 0 and 1 11 22 12( ) 2 0= + >C C CL f - . The 
latter inequality is formally demonstrated in Result 2. Therefore, 0  >  f .  
Now suppose that   <  f d  so that the cost of storage in equation (1) is ( )sd - f . We 
will prove that this generates a contradiction for s sufficiently small that an interior 
storage solution exists. In particular, system (2) would be written as 
  1 2
1 2
ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
    a      P q P q  +   + s = ,  
    b      s q  +  ,  q  + q  +  ,  q  +  = ,C C
    c   q    P q  + P q  +  q  +  ,  q q  +  ,  q  m = ,C C
d - d - d
f - f - f f - f r
- d d - f - f - f - f -
 (A1) 
so that (A1a) implies 0  <  d . But 0  +  s  >  r  so that (A1b) gives 1 ˆ ˆ( )q + , qC f - f  
2 ˆ ˆ( )> q + , qC f - f , while the Ostrowski condition, symmetry, and strict convexity imply 
that 0  >  f . Hence,   >  f d , and a contradiction has been generated. Therefore, the only 
consistent case is where  f ³ d . So (1) is correctly posed. And (2a), together with strict 
monotonicity of ( )P q , then implies that 0  >  d . 
 
Proof of Result 2.  Part (a) is immediate from equation (2¢a¢). For part (b), differen-
tiate equations (2¢b¢)-(2¢c¢) with respect to vector ˆ( )q, , sf  to obtain  
 22 11 12 11 22
12 22 22 111 11
ˆ 1
2
( 2 )
0
dq/ds
C C C C C
            =  .
2 + C  + +C C C C d /ds
æ ö æ ö
- - -æ ö ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷- a -è ø ç ÷ ç ÷fè ø è ø
 (A2) 
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Inversion yields 
 
22 11
11 12 221
ˆ
1
2 2  
dq/ds  C C
      =    ,
M
d /ds  + +  C C C
-æ ö æ ö
ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷f a +è ø è ø
 (A3) 
where 212 11 22 12 11 2214 4 2 (2 )M  =   + C C C C C C- a - - . Cost function convexity ensures that 
2
12 11 224 4C C C- <  0 . Convexity also ensures that, regardless of the sign of 12C , the 
inequality  0.511 2212 ( )C < C C  adheres. Thus, 11 22+C C  
0.5
11 222( )= +C C  
20.5 0.5
11 22( ) >C C-  
122 C   +
20.5 0.5
11 22 12( 2)   CC C- ³ . Therefore 11 22 122+ >C C C  and 11 22 12+  > 2C C C- . Since 
1 0>  a , it follows that 0M <  and that 0d /ds  f £ . As for the remainder of part (b), a 
differentiation of (2¢b¢)-(2¢c¢) with respect to vector ˆ( )q, , f -r  generates equation (A3) 
except that - r  replaces s . 
Regarding part (c), differentiate equations (2¢b¢)-(2¢c¢) with respect to vector 
ˆ( )q,  , mf  to generate  
 
22 11 12 11 22
12 22 22 111 11
ˆ 0
2
(2 2 )
1
dq/dm
C C C C C
            =  
+ C + +C C C C d /dm
æ ö æ ö
- - -æ ö ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷- a -è ø ç ÷ ç ÷fè ø è ø  (A4) 
with inverse 
 
11 12 22
22 11
ˆ 2
1
 dq/dm   + C C C
      =    .
M
d /dm  C C
-æ ö æ ö
ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷f -è ø è ø  (A5) 
Part (c) then follows. To verify part (d), use (A3) and (A5) to observe that 
ˆ ˆdq/ds   dq/d  == - r  22 11( )/M = d /dmC C- f .  
 
Proof of Result 3.  From (A3) we have that 11 11ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )]dq/ds = C q C q + /M- f - f . 
From Result 1 we know that 0  >  f . If 11Cˆ (q)  is an increasing function, then 
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11 11
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )C q < C q + - f f  and ˆdq/ds  > 0. A change in -r  acts in like fashion. Part (b) 
follows from a similar analysis of (A5). 
For part (c), we use the lock separability of system (2¢) to arrive at 
-1
1ˆ( ) 0.5d q+ /ds =   +d a  11 11ˆ ˆˆ ˆ[ ( )- ( )] 0C q C q + /M >- f f  if 111ˆ ( ) 0  0C q   q >³ " , and 
-1
1ˆ( ) 0.5d q /ds  =  +- d - a  11 11ˆ ˆˆ ˆ[ ( )- ( )] 0C q C q + /M < - f f  if 111ˆ ( ) 0 0C q    q > £ " . The 
relationships for price follow immediately. Upon observing that r  alters qˆ  but does not 
affect d , then it can be seen that part (d) follows from part (a). 
 
Proof of Result 4.  In each case, 11 22=C C . Then apply (A3) and (A5). 
 
Proof of Result 5.  Part (a) is immediate from (2²a), (2²b), and the fact that 
11 22 122+ >C C C , as established in Result 2. Part (b) is also immediate. In (c), an increase 
in cost seasonality has no effect on (2²a), and it act like a storage subsidy in (2²b). 
For part (d), note that storage costs operate as a separation parameter in system (2²), 
so that we can shock each equation without regard to spillovers. We have ˆd /dq =d  
1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]q q + / q  + q + P P P P- d - d - d d  where the denominator is negative. The 
numerator is negative (positive) when inverse demand is convex (concave). For parts (e) 
and (f), differentiate (2²b) and then apply analysis in Results 3 and 4. 
 
Proof of Result 6.  Note that (8b) and (8c) determine qˆ  and f . Equation (8a) is 
block separated in determining the equilibrium value of 2 +d k . Indeed, the equilibrium 
value of 2d + k  is invariant to k  since 1s/a  is invariant to k . And so the value of k  
does not affect consumption seasonality. 
Differentiating (8b)-(8c) with respect to the vector ˆ( )q, , f k  provides  
 
22 11 12 11 22
11 12 22 11 221
ˆ 0
2
2 2
1
dq/d
C C C C C
           =  .
+ + +C C C C C d /d
kæ ö æ ö
- - -æ ö ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷a -è ø ç ÷ ç ÷f k aè ø è ø  (A6) 
Inversion yields 
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11 12 22
1
22 11
ˆ 2dq/d +C C C
      =     ,
M
d /d C C
k -æ ö æ ö
aç ÷ ç ÷-ç ÷ ç ÷
ç ÷ ç ÷f k -è ø è ø  (A7) 
where the expression for M is as in the proof of Result 2. It follows that ˆ 0dq/d  k ³  from 
(A7), convexity of ( )a bC , q q , and the inequality 11 22 122+  C C C³  demonstrated in Result 
2. As for prices, employ (8a) to write qˆ - d - k  as 1ˆ 0.5 0.5q s/- k - a  so that 
ˆ ˆ( )d q /d =dq/d- d - k k k   0.5- . System (A7) then yields ˆ( )d q /d- d - k k  = 
2
11 22 122 ( ) 0  /M <C C C-  so that intervention increases price in the peak price period. 
Similarly, (8a) establishes that ˆ ˆ( )d q+ /d = dq/d   d k k -  0.5 0<  so that intervention also 
increases price in the trough price period. 
For parts (b) and (c), refer to Result 3 and Result 4 when studying (A7). 
 
Proof of Result 7.  For production seasonality, note that k  does not enter equation 
(8¢b). This reflects the fact that, under a quota regime, the firms seek only to minimize 
costs and do not care whether the product is destined for a landfill or consumption. As to 
consumption seasonality, please see Result 5(d). The effect documented there also 
describes the effect of product removal because storage allows the consequences of 
product removal to be smoothed over both seasons. 
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